Criminal Appeals

Massachusetts Supreme Court Rules Police Need ‘Reasonable Suspicion’ to Conduct Pat Frisks

Published on: May 29, 2010 | by Lefteris K. Travayiakis, Esq.

In reversing the Gun Crimes convictions of two men, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that police officers can no longer frisk someone during a routine encounter unless they have ‘reasonable suspicion’ to believe the person is involved in criminal activity and is armed and dangerous.

In the case of Commonwealth v. Jamal Martin, that defendant had been convicted of Carrying a Firearm Without a License, Carrying a Loaded Firearm, and Assault & Battery on a Police Officer. The incident occurred on October 8, 2006, when, at 10:30 a.m., Boston Police Officers were patrolling a ‘high crime area’ in which ‘numerous shootings’ had occurred and looking for a specific juvenile to execute an arrest warrant. During their patrol, they observed a young man wearing a sweatshirt with the hood up around his face and walking in the opposite direction from which the police were traveling. Although the police could not see his face, they ‘thought’ that this person might have an outstanding default warrant…[how does that make sense when they couldn’t see his face?]

The police turned their cruiser around and engaged the young man, a teenager, in conversation. Although the police quickly realized this young man was not the person they were looking for, and simply because the young man refused to continue to speak with the police, they proceeded to ask him if he had any weapons. Despite that Martin responded that he did not, the police nonetheless continued to frisk them “for their safety.” The frisk revealed a loaded gun.

Court Documents Admitted in Drunk Driving Trial Not Violative of Sixth Amendment’s Right to Confrontation

Published on: April 5, 2010 | by Lefteris K. Travayiakis, Esq.

If you have been following this blog, you have seen several recent posts about criminal convictions being reversed as a result of the Melendez-Diaz and Crawford decisions. These decisions have dramatically changed the landscape of permissible ‘testimonial’ evidence against a defendant at trial, but the scope of these decisions is limited.

In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Dale McMullin, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court pulled the reigns, so to speak, on the scope of Melendez-Diaz. The criminal defendant in this case was charged with several drunk driving related offenses, including Operating of a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Liquor, Fourth Offense (M.G.L. c. 90, section 24(1)(a)(1); Operating After Suspension, Second Offense (M.G.L. c. 90, section 23); and Failure to Stop for a Police Officer (M.G.L. c. 90, section 25). After his criminal conviction, the defendant appealed challenging the admissibility, competency and sufficiency of the public records used to establish his prior convictions.

Although the defendant acknowledged that the admissibility of Registry of Motor Vehicle records was permitted by Commonwealth v. Maloney, he argued that the Maloney decision was based on the Confrontation Clause analysis in Commonwealth v. Verde, which was later overturned by Melendez-Diaz.

Drug Conviction Overturned for Constitutional Violation

Published on: April 3, 2010 | by Lefteris K. Travayiakis, Esq.

In the recent case of Commonwealth v. Jorge Vasquez, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently overturned the conviction of the defendant, who had been tried and convicted of Possession of Cocaine, as well as Distribution of Cocaine. Despite his criminal defense lawyer’s failing to object at trial to the admission of the Massachusetts State Police Crime Laboratory Certificates of Drug Analysis, the Supreme Judicial Court still reversed his convictions as a result of his being deprive of his Right to Confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

At his criminal trial, the prosecutor did not call the Massachusetts State Police Crime Analyst at trial, but simply admitted the ‘Drug Certificates’. The Drug Certificates were signed by the analyst, but the court found a Sixth Amendment violation because the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the drug analyst. Although this was the preferred practice not too long ago, in the recent case of Melendez-Diaz, the United States Supreme Court ruled that drug certificates are testimonial in nature whose admission into evidence against a criminal defendant triggers the protections of the Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation.

The Massachusetts Supreme Court further ruled that, without the admission of the Drug Certificates or testimony certifying the seized substances were, in fact, cocaine, the defendant’s convictions on the charges could not stand and must be reversed. Although there was evidence that the ‘substances’ were “consistent with cocaine” and testimony from police officers relating to the likeness of the substances with cocaine, this was simply circumstantial evidence. Although a conviction can stand on only circumstantial evidence, the convictions in this case had to be reversed because the court could not say whether a jury would still have convicted had the improperly introduced Drug Certificates not been introduced.

Massachusetts Supreme Court Rejects Challenge for Gun Rights

Published on: March 31, 2010 | by Lefteris K. Travayiakis, Esq.

In the case of Commonwealth v. Jason Loadholt, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled on whether a defendant’s criminal prosecution for Unlawful Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition is violative of a person’s ‘right to bear arms’ as guaranteed by the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In his appeal to the SJC for his Gun/Firearms Charges, the defendant claimed that Massachusetts could not prosecute him for the various gun and ammunitions charges for not first having obtained a Firearms Identification Card because the United States Constitution guaranteed him, via the Second Amendment, his ‘Right to Bear Arms’.

In rejecting the defendant’s Constitutional claims in his appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reasoned, citing United States v. Cruikshank, that the Second Amendment “does not by its own force apply to anyone other than the Federal Government.” Rather, the Second Amendment means that it shall not be infringed any further by Congress, as opposed to the States. The Court explained that the Second Amendment “is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government.”

Massachusetts Supreme Court Rules Homeless Shelters Entitled to 4th Amendment Privacy Protections

Published on: March 25, 2010 | by Lefteris K. Travayiakis, Esq.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s recent decision of Commonwealth v. Porter P., a juvenile, focused on whether a person temporarily staying in room in a homeless transitional center is entitled to a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ against unlawful searches and searches. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in a 5-2 decision, ruled that they do!

By way of background, the juvenile defendant and his mother had moved into a room at the Roxbury Multi-Service Center Family House Shelter in March 2006, which provides temporary housing for homeless families and assists them towards securing a permanent home. A few months later, the shelter’s director heard rumors that the juvenile defendant had a gun and then contacted the Boston Police Department. The next morning, five Boston Police Officers arrived at the shelter, and with the permission from the Roxbury shelter’s directors, searched the juvenile’s room and found a .40 caliber Glock firearm. The juvenile was immediately arrested for Unlawful Possession of a Firearm; Unlawful Possession of Ammunition; and Delinquency.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in ruling for the juvenile defendant, found that

“the room that the juvenile and his mother shared at the shelter was a transitional living space, but it was nonetheless their home…”.

As a result, they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their ‘home’ at the shelter, and the Boston Police Officers’ search, without a warrant or consent by them, was violative of their 4th Amendment Right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.

Massachusetts Supreme Court Reverses Gun Conviction for Constitutional Violation

Published on: February 26, 2010 | by Lefteris K. Travayiakis, Esq.

A defendant who was convicted for the gun crimes of Carrying a Firearm Without a License and Carrying a Loaded Firearm recently had his convictions overturned because the admission of the Ballistics Certificate, without live expert testimony, violated his Right to Confrontation under the 6th Amendment of the United States Constitution.

At his criminal jury trial in the District Court, the prosecutor sought to prove that the gun at issue was an operable firearm with evidence consisting only of the Ballistics Certificate, which is simply a police ballistician’s certification that the firearm has been examined, tested and found to be functional. The ballistician who examined the firearm was not called as a witness by the prosecutor at trial, and therefore was not available to the defendant’s criminal defense lawyer for cross-examination. The Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that, because the ballistician was not made available to the defense for cross-examination of his findings, the defendant’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was violated. Read the full Massachusetts Supreme Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. William Rivera.

The reversal of the defendants gun convictions follows the recent ruling in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, where the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the prosecution cannot prove its case with affidavits and without the benefit of live witness testimony. The case of Melendez-Diaz involved a drug trial where the prosecutor admitted a Certificate of Drug Analysis in lieu of the chemist’s testimony that the contraband seized by the police was, in fact, cocaine.

Criminal Defendants’ Right to a Public Trial Extends to Jury Selection Process

Published on: February 24, 2010 | by Lefteris K. Travayiakis, Esq.

The U.S. States Supreme Court recently ruled that a defendant’s Constitutional Right (per the 6th Amendment) was violated when the court refused to allow his uncle from watching the jury voir dire process at his criminal trial. As a result the ruling, the man had his cocaine trafficking conviction overturned.

In general, because the public has a First Amendment Right to access the jury voir dire process, a criminal defendant also has a Sixth Amendment Right to a public trial. In other words, the Supreme Court essentially stated that it doesn’t make sense for the public to have the right of access to public proceedings, but to then deny a defendant his right to to a public trial.

In this particular case, Presley v. Georgia, the criminal defendant’s lawyer objected to the trial court from excluding the defendant’s uncle from sitting in the same room with prospective jurors. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, in a criminal trial, the courts are obligated to accommodate the public access.